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Abstract 
 
 
This article analyses the implication of municipal governments and civil society actors in 
immigration through multilevel and collaborative governance arrangements. It argues that 
studying the roles of ambiguities is critical to understanding the activism of political entities with 
ill-defined status and mandates, such as municipalities and Francophone minority communities. 
This research adds to the literature on the “local turn” in highlighting that ambiguities are both a 
condition —i.e., a driver that makes collaborative and multilevel arrangements work—and an 
outcome of collaboration practices, characterized by ambiguities regarding the balance of power, 
the aims of collaboration in a competitive sector, and by conflicting forms of accountabilities. The 
article identifies three approaches that actors use to deal with these ambiguities in a context where 
resources are not equitably distributed and where the role of the federal government is critical. In 
this configuration, municipalities and FMCs develop adaptive, rather than transformative, 
approaches to ambiguities. 
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Introduction  
 
The involvement of municipal governments and civil society actors in policy-making processes 
traditionally associated with senior levels of government is now well acknowledged (Guiraudon 
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and Lahav, 2000). It corresponds to the growing awareness that despite remaining disconnected 
from the major sites of political decision making, local and societal actors matter when it comes 
to tackling complex issues such as climate change, homelessness, economic development, 
employability, health, or immigration. In immigration, the inclusion of such actors is often 
presented in the literature as the “local turn” (Caponio and Borkert, 2010).   
 
This article focuses on two Canadian political entities participating in this “local turn,” and 
illustrates a dual shift in the policy process downwards to municipalities and outwards to organized 
civil society, such as actors from Francophone minority communities (FMCs). FMCs refer to the 
one million francophones who live in minority communities in provinces and territories outside 
Québec. These minority communities are served by a myriad of institutions and community-based 
organizations that defend and promote language rights, lobby governments, offer sociocultural 
programming and deliver services in French. In each province and territory, a representative 
organization draws together this constellation of community-based organizations.1 At the national 
and international levels, the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada 
(FCFA) serves as FMCs’ main voice and advocate.2  
 
If the roles of municipalities and FMCs in immigration have been examined separately, researchers 
have, with few exceptions (notably Andrew, 2011), overlooked the comparison. At first glance, 
municipalities and FMCs have little in common. Yet, one similarity is that, despite having no 
specific jurisdictional responsibilities in immigration and occupying a non-dominant position in 
the policy-making process, both municipalities and FMCs play a vital role in mediating 
interventions to meet local needs, deal with governance challenges and seize opportunities related 
to immigration, notably through their inclusion in federal-funded collaborative networks, such as 
the Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) and the Réseaux en immigration francophones (RIFs). 
In this context, this article asks, why is their involvement possible? Which forms does it take? 
What does it tell us about policy making and more generally about collaborative and multilevel 
governance arrangements?  
 
To answer these questions, I use a “most-different-cases” comparative design and study three cities 
(Moncton, Winnipeg, Vancouver) and three FMCs in their respective provinces (New Brunswick, 
Manitoba and British Columbia). The interest of this comparative design relies upon identifying 
possible forms of convergence, particularly in terms of governance, despite the presence of key 
institutional differences. This type of comparison is in line with the resurgence of territory and 
locality in comparative politics (Broschek, Petersohn, and Toubeau, 2017) as well as with the move 
beyond “methodological nationalism” in migration studies (Glick Schiller and Caglar, 2011).  
 
This research highlights the roles of ambiguities regarding governance processes and offers new 
insights into the significant characteristics of the “local turn.” In the Canadian case particularly, 
Tuohy (1992) recognizes that ambiguity can lead to policy innovation and diffusion, but underlines 
that this might be accomplished at the expense of the broader public. Her main contribution is to 
show how ambiguities are “quintessential” to the country’s politics and policies. The specificity 
of ambiguity in Canada is its institutionalization, namely its embeddedness within the structures 
of the provincial and federal governments. But what we are lacking now is an understanding of 
how these ambiguities play out in the context of greater collaboration beyond traditional elites.  
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This paper aims to fill this void by drawing attention to the fact that engagement in collaborative 
governance does not mean that the actors engaged in these forms of collaboration inevitably share 
the same vision about public action. On the contrary, conflicts and competition are at the heart of 
governance mechanisms, and they steer social and political processes (Le Galès, 2011). Individuals 
and groups have different interests, goals, and priorities. However, agency is not a simple matter 
of adding together actors’ strategies: their expectations and interests are structured by institutions 
and by the meanings they give to institutions. This is why ambiguities are key to public policy 
making: they “provide critical openings for creativity and agency; individuals exploit their inherent 
openness to establish new precedents for action that can ‘transform the way institutions allocate 
power and authority’ within institutions and among them” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009: 12). 
 
Therefore, this article shows that ambiguities are both (i) a condition for increased participation 
on the part of municipal governments and civil society actors along the continuum of immigration 
(ii) as well as an outcome of such participation, notably in the LIPs and RIFs networks. The article 
then presents three approaches that actors adopt as they navigate within a collaborative and 
multilevel governance framework, namely “maintaining,” “exploiting,” or “delegating” the 
management of ambiguities.  
 
Canadian Ambiguities in Collaborative and Multilevel Governance Arrangements 
 
Municipalities and FMCs share a subordinate position within Canadian institutions. In the early 
1980s and the subsequent Constitutional debates, both municipalities and FMCs organizations 
campaigned for stronger constitutional status. Municipalities sought to gain a formal recognition 
that could protect them from the discretionary power of the provinces. FMC representative 
organizations asked for a formal recognition of a special status within the Constitution and for a 
constitutional consecration of their collective rights (Léger, 2015). The failure to gain more 
autonomy and authority through federal constitutional amendment3 has led municipalities and 
FMC organizations to develop different strategies conducive to more incremental changes in their 
roles and responsibilities. In Canada, such implication has been studied through concepts such as 
“deep federalism” (Leo, 2006) or “urban governance” (Andrew et al., 2002) as a way to better 
account for the involvement of these actors in the federal regime. Moving away from the traditional 
institutional focus on “strong” or “weak” jurisdictional powers, this body of literature studies the 
agency and discretionary powers of local governments (Smith and Stewart, 2006). Similarly, a 
notion like “shared governance” (Forgues, 2012) highlights the inclusion of FMC representative 
organizations in policy making as well as their need to innovate in order to respond to the challenge 
of rethinking the nature of their own place within Canadian federalism (Cardinal and Forgues, 
2015). 
 
These frameworks share a common attempt to account for the dynamics between stakeholders and 
render the resulting policy-making process more intelligible in a context where traditional actors, 
such as the federal and provincial governments and their bureaucracies, are no longer the only 
legitimate players. The importance of building relationships among actors—whether they be from 
the government, private and civil society sectors—has been referred to as the “collaboration 
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imperative” (Kettl, 2006). Besides the complex and interrelated nature of political problems 
themselves, reasons for collaboration include: the challenge of providing, without duplicating, 
quality services; the desire to achieve greater coordination within different departments and 
divisions; the need to find innovative solutions that reach beyond administrative silos; the sharing 
of and sharing in both expertise and resources; and the decentralization and deconcentration of 
powers that makes the challenge of coordinating all that much more difficult (Williams, 2012). 
This is, when it is at its best, what this literature calls “the collaborative advantage” (Huxham, 
1993; Doberstein, 2016).  
 
Today, few would question the fact that collaboration has become central to policy making.  
Nevertheless, collaboration cannot in itself be thought an advantage. How do we create a “common 
good” when different interests, various cultures, and multiple forms of management and 
responsibility coexist? The conditions of effective collaboration, therefore, are key to collaborative 
governance arrangements (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Likewise, the reasons why governance can 
become dysfunctional—including the frustration caused by low levels of participation in the 
network, bad relations, or a lack of trust among actors—are also explored (Rigg and O’Mahony, 
2013). One source of such problems is the ambiguity surrounding the missions, resources, 
capacities, responsibilities, and accountabilities of different organizations (Kettl, 2006). As a 
result, it is generally recommended that ambiguities be clarified so as to ensure a successful 
collaboration (Paquet and Andrew, 2015). And yet, it is often the ambiguity surrounding these 
issues that serves to justify the importance of collaboration. Therefore, ambiguities are hard to 
preclude. To cope with ambiguity, actors try to attach meanings to it (Zahariadis, 2003). 
 
As defined by Matland (1995), ambiguity can refer to an “ambiguity of goals” or an “ambiguity 
of means.” The ambiguity of goals refers to actors’ differing interpretations of policy goals or 
institution mandates. Their framing depends on the multiple social and governmental “sense-
makers” who have diverging interests and expectations (Dewulf and Biesbroek, 2018). In this 
view, ambiguity is not considered something to suppress. Rather, it is a necessary condition to 
aggregate competing interests and values, in particular to avoid antagonizing actors and to favour 
incremental changes through flexibility in implementation (Matland, 1995). “Ambiguity of 
means” on the other hand implies ambiguities about the roles played by various stakeholders and 
refers to a complex policy-making environment. This is notably the case for partnerships involving 
actors playing multiple roles, like “government agencies as both funders and partners; local 
government as both government and community representatives, and community organizations as 
both service providers and community representatives” (Larner and Butler, 2005: 93). The work 
of steering partnerships or networks is often under the purview of the main funding body and can 
lead to cooptation, or “institutionalized subornment” of other stakeholders (Doberstein, 2013). As 
shown by Kassim and Le Galès (2010), this ambiguity of means may be used as a smokescreen to 
hide debates about the policy content as well as depoliticize issues. Likewise, when civil society 
actors play an active role in policy making, they might seek to promote their interests before public 
benefits and outcomes. This creates potential accountability concerns: the inclusion of private and 
non-profit actors does not negate institutional constraints and constitutional responsibilities. 
Therefore, elected governments are still held accountable and might be tempted to hold the other 
stakeholders under “varying degrees of control or supervision” (Doberstein, 2013: 589).  
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A “Most Different Cases” Comparative Design 
 
The governance of immigration seems a particularly fruitful point of focus given the increasing 
implication of municipal and civil society actors in this area. Reasons for this implication include: 
improving their economy as well as modulating the social fabric of their communities, being more 
responsive to specific immigrants’ needs, filling policy gaps, developing their capacities, or 
counter-balancing more restrictive approaches to citizenship. Case selection is based on the “most 
different systems” design: besides providing a stronger basis for coherent explanations in small-N 
studies, this methodological strategy features forms of convergence in unexpected contexts 
(Anckar, 2008). While acknowledging the institutional differences between (and within) 
municipalities and FMCs organizations, the selection is in fact based on diversity in terms of the 
relative size of their total population, the percentage of immigrants, francophones—as well as the 
percentage of immigrants within the francophone population—within each metropolitan area. As 
a result, I carried a case-oriented approach to cross-case analysis (Khan & VanWynsberghe, 2008) 
in the greater Moncton, Winnipeg and Vancouver areas. The variety of these configurations is 
illustrated in the table below. Details at the provincial, metropolitan and municipal levels are 
available in the Appendix. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
To support this comparison, I have combined a document analysis (of policies, action plans and 
programs) with semi-structured interviews conducted with seventeen key actors at the community, 
municipal and federal levels in 2017-18. I used the N-Vivo program for coding documents and 
interviews. Quotations originally in French have been translated.  
 
1. Ambiguities as Drivers of a “Local Turn” in Immigration 
 
Municipalities and FMC organizations are in an ill-defined position within Canadian institutions. 
Two main ambiguities characterize them: the ambivalence surrounding their mandates and their 
status. The ambiguity about their mandates can be understood as an ambiguity of goals whereas 
the ambivalences about their status mostly speaks to an ambiguity of means and their legitimacy 
as political actors.  
 
1.1 An Ill-Defined Position within Canadian Institutions 
 
First, tensions between political representation and services delivery characterize both 
municipalities and FMC organizations. Municipal governments share fundamental characteristics 
with their provincial and federal counterparts, including an elected representative assembly and 
the power to both levy taxes and use force. Municipalities also enjoy strong electoral legitimacy; 
mayors being directly elected by the population. Nevertheless, it is often assumed that they are 
apolitical institutions mostly dedicated to service delivery, like hospitals or schools. Unlike 
municipalities, FMC organizations do not have legislative or taxation powers. They operate as a 
constellation of civil society actors dedicated to lobbying governments and service delivery rather 
than political communities (Traisnel, 2012). Yet, each provincial or territorial FMC representative 
organization holds a general assembly where members-only elections are held.4 By claiming to 
 
  6
speak for francophones in their province or territory as a whole, regardless of the actual number 
of members they represent formally, a similar mechanism of democratic representation to that of 
governments is therefore at stake (Gallant, 2010). 
 
Second, ambiguities also frame the roles played by municipalities and FMCs. In spite of a general 
shift towards more autonomous municipal governments, the 2018 Ford government’s decision to 
reduce the seats of the Toronto City Council reminds us of their subordination to their respective 
provinces. Provinces still define municipal responsibilities, their revenues, or the organization of 
their electoral systems. As provinces’ “creatures,” municipalities are not supposed to have direct 
relationships with the federal government. However, depending on government interest in cities 
and their conceptions of federalism, municipalities can count on some federal support. For 
instance, as Bradford noted, the federal government tends to pursue an “implicit” national urban 
policy, characterized by its “informal connection, indirect leadership, and interactive governance” 
(2018: 15). Nevertheless, notwithstanding institutional constraints and changing relationships with 
the federal and the provincial governments, municipalities can, in certain cases, take local action 
without jurisdictional authority. In fact, the absence of a definition of municipal powers in the 
Constitution can facilitate their inclusion in domains which are not clearly part of their mandates 
(Smith and Stewart, 2006). As for FMCs, their representative organizations express various 
demands for greater autonomy based on their aspirations to democratic representation and political 
participation. They aim to gain more control over their institutions and the services they deliver 
(Forgues, 2012). To meet these claims, multiple joint-governance and consultative mechanisms 
have been created in order to involve FMC representative organizations in the design and the 
implementation of public policies. In specific areas such as education, researchers consider that 
they even enjoy a limited form of non-territorial autonomy (Chouinard, 2019). The recent—albeit 
precarious—inclusion of some FMC representative organizations in intergovernmental debates5 
also indicates forms of recognition of their political and democratic representation roles. Yet, many 
argue that their closer integration in the policy-making process has also resulted in a larger 
financial dependence towards the federal government, limiting FMC autonomy to tailor their 
activities and services (Forgues, 2012). FMC inclusion within governance spheres is distinct from 
a right to autonomy which would force the federal government to delegate a portion of its power 
(Léger, 2015). If FMC aspiration for autonomy structures with real normative power is possible, 
it still depends on the discretion of the legislator (Foucher, 2012). In sum, ambiguities around 
status and mandates create some openings, which enable municipal and civil society actors to 
manoeuvre in the governance of immigration and exceed their traditional policy stances to become 
vehicles for public action.  
 
1.2 Implication of Municipalities and FMCs on the Immigration Continuum 
 
Municipalities and FMC organizations began designing and implementing measures and policies 
towards immigrants in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s respectively. Their involvement along the 
continuum (from attraction/selection to citizenship) became more visible in the 2000s, 
corresponding to their increased participation in multilevel and collaborative governance 
arrangements (Fourot, 2015). Both entities are most active in the area of integration and the 
provision of services. They have developed programs, networks, and partnerships in providing 
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recreation and cultural services, support for employment and businesses, anti-discrimination 
programs or English/French language training.  
 
At present, measures and programs developed by municipalities and FMCs organizations in the 
area of immigration are closely tied to their participation in Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs) 
and the Réseaux en immigration francophone (RIFs). These networks are excellent illustrations of 
multilevel and collaborative governance arrangements. They are constituted by various 
stakeholders6  involved in immigration. The RIFs were created in 2003, coming out of discussions 
held at the joint CIC-FMC committee in 2002. This committee7  acknowledged francophone 
communities’ lack of capacity to recruit, receive, and integrate French-speaking immigrants. The 
committee also confirmed the importance of acting in the interests of francophone communities 
when designing and implementing policies. The LIPs were created in 2008, following discussions 
within the Municipal Immigration Committee in Ontario (Burr, 2011). Initially limited to this 
province, LIPs were extended to the rest of the country in 2012, demonstrating the federal interest 
in encouraging increased municipal involvement in immigration. In fact, the mere creation of the 
LIPs may be interpreted as an occasion for Ottawa to deploy an urban agenda on immigration 
without actually naming it. Indeed, the federal government finances indirect services; 
municipalities may, or not, serve as LIP institutional leaders8 and LIP programs are conceptualized 
by local communities. Nevertheless, this form of remote steering ensures federal government 
presence in key economic, social, and cultural hubs. This approach also allows the federal 
government to shape local activities and programs, without “provoking” the provinces, who might 
view more direct relations with municipalities as an encroachment upon provincial jurisdiction. 
Their involvement within different LIPs is not uniform, this model allowing for varied local 
arrangements. Neither the LIPs nor the RIFs offer direct service delivery. They remain under the 
supervision of what Doberstein refers to as a “metagovernor” (2013), namely IRCC bureaucrats. 
Both networks remain convening and steering bodies, whose main goal is to foster partnerships to 
better coordinate services delivered by LIP members at the local level, and, provincially, by RIF 
participants.  
 
If the decision of “who gets in” remains ultimately a prerogative of the federal and provincial 
governments, cities and FMCs are not formally prohibited from getting more involved in 
immigrant selection. Therefore, in continuity with the Atlantic Pilot Program, the federal 
government launched a Rural and Northern Immigration Pilot Program in 2019 giving local 
stakeholders, in partnership with rural communities, the ability to recommend candidates for 
permanent residency. In line with these recent regional-focused immigration programs, IRCC 
plans to launch a new Municipal Nominee Pilot, aimed at helping small cities to address their 
particular labour force needs. Although the details of this program are still to be unveiled, its main 
goal is to allow municipalities, chambers of commerce, and local labour councils to directly 
sponsor their permanent residents (IRCC, 2020).  
 
FMCs are also particularly vigilant with regards to selection tools since immigration is viewed as 
an instrument to preserve linguistic duality in Canada. 9  In this context, cities and FMC 
organizations have developed specific strategies for attracting immigrants to their communities.  
 
 
  8
Finally, cities have implemented policies aimed at counterbalancing more restrictive approaches 
to immigration policies and citizenship. Allowing permanent residents to vote in municipal 
elections is being discussed in Moncton as well as in Winnipeg, whereas Vancouver passed such 
a resolution in 2018. Adopting an “access without fear policy” to provide access to municipal 
services regardless of immigration status is also on the agenda in Winnipeg,10 while Vancouver 
adopted such a policy in 2016. Both cases show that municipalities are active in areas not 
traditionally assigned to them. Paradoxically, one can argue that municipalities are active in these 
areas because they know that franchise rights in municipal elections depend on provincial approval 
and that cities follow federal laws in matters of deportation. I will elaborate on this point in the 
next section. For FMC organizations, the launch of the “Welcoming Francophone 
Communities”—an initiative introduced by the federal “Francophone Immigration Strategy” and 
supported by the Action Plan for Official Languages 2018-2023—shows the recognition of FMC 
legitimacy in welcoming immigrants. The initiative can be viewed  as a kind of citizenization 
tool—i.e. the progressive building of a relationship between citizens and a political community 
(Auvachez, 2009)—that contributes to fostering a sense of belonging (and retention rates) among 
French-speaking newcomers (Sidney, 2014).  
 
Overall, despite the lack of formal responsibilities in immigration, the ambiguities surrounding the 
mandates and the roles of both municipalities and FMC organizations do not preclude their 
participation in the governance of immigration. On the contrary, ambiguity around their mandates 
and status appears to be one factor that enables their activism.  Empirically, cities and communities 
as diverse as Moncton, Vancouver, and Winnipeg are active on the immigration continuum; 
providing both direct and indirect services, as well as politically representing the interests of 
immigrants. The role of ambiguities is not limited to being a driving force of public policy, 
however. In the next section, I analyze (i) how activism and collaboration in turn create new 
ambiguities, and (ii) the strategies actors adopt to manage them.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the roles of ambiguities as conditions and outcomes of FMC and municipality 
participation in the governance of immigration. 
  
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
2. Ambiguities as Outcomes of Collaboration 
 
Actors participating in the governance of immigration are motivated by the prospect of 
contributing to the economic success of their communities, as well as to the social and cultural 
integration of newcomers. Collaboration is often praised, particularly ensuring as it does fewer 
gaps/overlaps in service delivery and a better coordination between actors. However, collaboration 
can create new ambiguities in governance processes, because it often involves imbalances in power 
relations, leadership and authority; differences in capacity, legitimacy and resources; competition 
between stakeholders; as well as consequences in the area of advocacy and accountability.  
 
2.1 Power Relations, Capacity, Advocacy and Competition 
 
 
  9
While promoting collaboration and a local-based definition of policy goals, FMC and municipality 
participation in immigration allows the federal government to gather specific information and to 
gain some form of indirect control over other stakeholders. Given the nature of Canadian 
federalism and the geographic scope of the country, the capacity of metagovernors to steer 
networks in specific directions is critical. Stakeholders who observe this dynamic see it as a form 
of asymmetrical power relations, some even describing them  as “father-child relationships” 11 
between a federal government that funds the services and those who deliver them.12 In all cases, 
the funder’s presence on the table influences the other actors’ discourses, including those of city 
governments who avoid controversial topics deemed “too political”13 and therefore, tends to create 
forms of “advocacy chill” (Acheson & Laforest, 2013).  
 
Capacity and resources are critical factors to be considered while stakeholders are engaged in a 
collaborative process. The “survival mode” under which several francophone organizations 
describe themselves as operating limits their ability to participate in collaboration mechanisms. 
Instead of establishing mid- to long-term strategies, they spend their time on administrative duties 
or on “fighting” to keep or obtain funding.14 This is paradoxical since one of the main goals of 
collaboration is to increase FMC capacities. 
 
Therefore, collaboration can lead to an increased rivalry in the context of scarce resources for not-
for-profit organizations. While promoting collaboration through RIFs and LIPs, the federal 
funding arrangement in fact favors competition in the settlement sector and might contribute to 
confusion and distrust. Because IRCC covers LIP administrative costs but does not fund 
implementation strategies, LIPs need to seek external funding, potentially putting the network in 
competition with its own members (Angeles and Shcherbya, 2019). In certain cases, both IRCC 
and FMCs are aware that tensions might have increased because of collaboration: “there is tension 
between partners… we know that certain RIFs face challenges regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of everyone involved. It’s not always clear… there are many new actors in the field 
of francophone immigration.”15 This is notably the case in the area of economic development and 
employability where the RIF and RDÉE (Réseau de développement économique et 
d’employabilité) are both active players. As one IRCC public servant highlights: 
  
In some cases, the RIF coordinator will work very well with the RDÉE, but in other 
cases, there is competition between them. This leads us to reflect over whether this 
is indeed the best model… whether we are doing everything in our power to help 
RIFs and whether or not our work is doing more harm than good. We have to 
evaluate this.16  
 
FMC evaluation tends to concur that the government contributes to this competition because of 
the funding model. 17 
 
2.2 Legitimacy and Accountability 
This is far from being an isolated case since IRCC is the main funding body for the RIFs and the 
LIPs. Beyond conflicts about funding or the legitimacy needed to offer certain services to 
newcomers (e.g. the resettlement of Syrian refugees in New Brunswick),18 closer collaboration 
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between networks can trigger other concerns. For instance, is the RIFs’ absorption by the LIPs one 
implicit goal of the federal government? Those questions are crucial for FMCs, which, above all, 
seek to avoid comparison with ethnic groups or “multicultural” community organizations. As 
expressed by one FCFA representative: 
I’ll give you an example of something that completely outraged me. I yelled. (…). 
There’s something…either a forum or a day of reflection that is being prepared in 
the West, organized by the LIP, the title being: “How do we engage francophone 
and ethnocultural communities?” See, there isn’t even room for discussion. When 
you see those two words together (…), bringing an official language community to 
the same level as an ethnocultural community, it’s very dangerous.19  
Tensions between anglophone and francophone organizations, or between underrepresented 
groups—such as newcomers and indigenous peoples—illustrate well the specific roles of race, 
language and national identities in Canadian political competition (Good, 2014).20 In Winnipeg 
for instance, there is a competition 
for resources for programming specifically for underprivileged people which both 
the newcomer and indigenous population fall into… there is a successful youth 
program through the Indigenous Relations Division of the City that provides 
internship and summer employment for Indigenous youth. And the newcomer 
group wanted to use that as a model for the city to create such a program for 
newcomer youth. And that didn’t quite work yet.21  
 
Moreover, when actors wear multiple hats—such as networks coordinators and employees of an 
organization—questions are sometimes raised regarding the interests they represent.  As explained 
by an IRCC public servant:  
 
Ideally, the networks would be independent, but their status is not always clear 
as they are not incorporated. (…) They must receive funding from a recognized 
institution that has all the necessary paperwork. As a result, we must finance an 
organization to manage the RIF. However, at times the RIF coordinator will have... 
Uhm... an employer who has different requirements to fulfill than the members of 
the RIF, which often puts the coordinator in a problematic situation.22 
 
Finally, collaboration can create new forms of ambiguities in terms of accountability. For instance, 
collaboration might be use as a way to “pass the buck.” According to a community leader,  
 
You know, the IRCC’s argument that they are not alone in immigration… 
Employment and Social Development, for the credential recognition and all that... 
It remains that it’s they who have the leadership… It’s they who have the 
leadership. They have a responsibility to work with other partners to fairly develop 
a policy that holds up in terms of immigration.23 
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The same applies to municipal governments and their relationships with other community 
stakeholders. In Moncton, for instance, the municipal government insists on the fact that it is the 
“individual organizations that do the actions. The LIP just helps coordinate, but the individual 
organizations move the actions forward.”24 In this case, who is accountable for the decisions 
made? Is it the agreement holder that has the partnership with the federal government or the 
community partners that decide on the actions to pursue? This situation is even more complicated 
when the agreement holder is not a governmental body (such as in the cases of RIFs and non-profit 
organizations for the LIPs) and has no formal democratic legitimacy. Moreover, one characteristic 
of the non-profit sector is that it has multiple forms of accountability (immigrants, communities, 
boards, staff, general public, etc.). How are these forms of accountability balanced, given the fact 
that  accountability to the funder seems to trump all of them (Lowe et al. 2017)? 
 
Given all the “flaws” and the complications attributed to collaborative governance, one might think 
that local actors do not support these types of arrangements. However, none of them have 
considered withdrawing from these networks, and overall, they are very supportive of them. One 
discourse emerging from this situation is to reduce the ambiguities resulting from collaboration, 
notably in clarifying stakeholders’ roles. However, as we have seen, those arrangements work 
precisely because they rely on a certain degree of ambiguity. Moreover, actors do not have the 
same capacity and resources to influence collaborative arrangements, which explains, at least in 
part, why actors develop strategies to manage those ambiguities rather than reject them.  
 
3. Approaches to Navigating within a Collaborative and Multilevel Governance 
Framework 
 
I have observed three main approaches to navigating the ambiguities created by a multilevel and 
collaborative governance framework. One approach consists of (i) maintaining or even creating 
certain ambiguities, (ii) another relies on exploiting them, (iii) while a third involves delegating its 
management to others. Those approaches are not exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, 
they illustrate three major ways in which actors manage ambiguities, give meaning to them, and 
in this way engage in policy making.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
  
3.1 Maintaining Ambiguities 
 
The first approach aims to maintain ambiguity, precisely to drive action without the “burden” of 
accountability. As democratically accountable bodies, governments seek credit and face potential 
sanctions from their electors (Weaver, 1986). For municipalities, this means maintaining a blurred 
definition of their responsibilities in immigration. For instance, Winnipeg has not yet adopted a 
specific immigration policy despite its inclusive political discourse (e.g. the mayor’s commitment 
to welcoming and supporting refugees) and some immigration-related activities. Rather, the city 
has developed a civic approach that favours the notion of “diversity” in “religions, education, 
sexual orientation, cultures, styles, belief systems, ways of thinking, and much more.” In this sense, 
the term “newcomers” does not specifically refer to an immigration status but includes all 
newcomers to the city. Likewise, immigration is considered through non-specific departments (e.g. 
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Community Services) and advisory committees (e.g. Citizen Equity Committee). Similarly, the city 
has not formally implemented measures in support of young “newcomers” in spite of providing 
internships and summer employment opportunities for indigenous youth. The municipal 
justification for this tack is the presence of legal obstacles to “self-declaration” compared to 
employment equity groups such as “Aboriginal.”25 Nevertheless, having a “general policy” based 
on an ambivalent definition of “newcomers” also prevents the municipality from shouldering 
responsibility in this area.26 Indeed, one key feature of the diversity rhetoric is its ambivalence and 
vagueness (Schiller, 2017) that results in an increased level of discretion in implementation 
(Bastien, 2009) as well as in diluting accountability towards specific groups under the umbrella of 
advocating for inclusiveness. This approach allows the city to position itself so as to avoid blame, 
or take credit, depending on the stakes at play. 
 
3.2 Exploiting Ambiguities 
 
A second approach to dealing with ambiguities is to seek to maximize actor participation in a 
whole range of available mediation channels. Collaborative arrangements do not mean that 
stakeholders have to give up on actions they could otherwise have undertaken (such as advocacy, 
court challenges, political pressures, or going public). On the contrary, ambiguities of means 
(where one might function as either—or simultaneously—partner, rival or dependent, etc.) also 
provide a way to access information not easily obtained. Actors can thus better negotiate for 
specific outcomes and/or get a better understanding about the actions of other actors in the 
decision-making process.  
 
For instance, as put forward by one IRCC public servant, networks are considered as “a tool 
through which the government and the immigration department can access information they would 
not be able to get otherwise.”27 Governmental bodies are not the only ones using collaborative 
governance in this sense. As this francophone community representative explains, local 
collaboration might inform subsequent strategies at the national level: “We collect a lot of our 
information from the field, so as to give a better reflection at the national level. This results in... I 
don’t like the term “taking a stance” but… having clear ideas on how to influence the strategies.”28 
 
Some municipal governments also embrace the ambiguities around the LIP mechanism because it 
is a way to counterbalance the fact that there is “no” direct relationships with the federal 
government. They consider it an opportunity to consolidate their position. For instance, as the LIP 
agreement holder, the City of Moncton saw advantages in “feeding information to the federal 
government” and “to be able to work more closely with it” especially since IRCC restructured and 
closed several of their local offices across Canada in 2012. 29  Municipal public servants in 
Vancouver also consider the advantages of keeping forms of “internal advocacy”30 with the federal 
government through this collaboration forum. 
 
FMC’s organizations play on the ambiguity of means so as to be both critics and partners of the 
federal government. One FCFA representative highlights the importance of maintaining a balance 
between pressuring and partnering with the federal government, resulting from the ambivalence 
around their mandates: 
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Part of our role is to collaborate with the IRCC-FMC committee. However, we have 
another mission too, that is one of representation… as well as advocacy... We have 
to protect our [linguistic] rights… we have to remind the federal government of its 
responsibilities. It is not always easy to do both. Of course. But (...) it is actually 
important to maintain some distance, in order to be able to intervene. (…) We work 
[with the federal government], but we are activists at the same time. We cannot 
hide from that fact.”31  
 
If embracing the ambiguities of collaborative governance means seeking to maximize 
opportunities for action and reinforcing actor capacities or power, another approach is to delegate 
the management of this ambiguity to others.  
 
3.3 Delegating Ambiguities 
 
This third approach allows actors to avoid conflicts and to position themselves as leaders at the 
same time. The debates regarding Vancouver’s status as a “sanctuary city” and the working model 
for the LIPs and RIFs will serve as illustrations. Federal cuts to refugee health coverage announced 
in 2012 triggered the opposition of front-line workers, individuals, civil society organizations as 
well as governments. The City of Vancouver adopted a critical tone towards federal immigration 
policies that initiated several debates within the Vancouver Mayor’s Working Group on 
Immigration32 and eventually led to the adoption of an “access without fear” policy in 2016. 
Nevertheless, even before the adoption of this policy, no immigration status was required to access 
municipal services and no immigration status information was collected by the City. In adopting 
this policy, the municipality recognized that the concrete impacts on its functioning were low, 
which can partly explain why this decision was made. At the municipal level, all the actors were 
aware that the main issue has always been the relationship between the police and the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA). Nevertheless, the decision-making process is worth laying bare. 
Doing so reveals some strategic aspects of collaborative governance, namely the self-positioning 
of the City as a welcoming environment, a responsive government and a progressive leader in 
immigration while, in fact, it delegates the actual management of this issue to others, notably by 
asking the Police Board to consider adopting a similar policy. Indeed, in the two years following 
the adoption of the policy, the Vancouver Police Department 33  (VPD) and community 
organizations have been in conflict over VPD’s cooperation with the CBSA. In the end, the VPD 
issued guidelines in 2018 to reassure victims and witnesses that contacting the municipal police 
would not automatically lead to their deportation but refused to dissociate itself from the CBSA 
and to remove their officers’ ability to contact the CBSA,  an insufficient adjustment according to 
some grassroots organizations. 
 
Delegating the management of ambiguity is also an approach observed in immigration networks. 
The working model for the LIPs and RIFs is based on a transfer of information up from the local 
to the federal, and vice versa. Nonetheless, because of the power imbalances discussed in the 
previous section, both systems mostly function as a top-down mechanism, that not only reproduce 
actor hierarchies in the settlement sector due to the funding model for direct settlement services 
(Sadiq, 2004)  but also adds a new tier of delegation since the federal government is the funding 
agency for indirect services (immigration networks) as well. In this context, not only are larger 
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multi-service organizations (second tier) dependent on the federal government with smaller 
community-based organizations (third tier) dependent on the large settlement agencies, but both 
of them now rely on the network coordinators and agreement holders (first tier). This federal public 
servant’s quote illustrates the first tier of delegation: “you simply have to be able to gather key 
people and, for us, they [the networks] are where that work gets done at the local level.”34 The 
second tier of delegation refers to the network coordinators and agreement holders who are seen 
as the main interlocutors of the federal government, whose particular concern is to be in relation 
with “one interlocutor.”35 Finally, in the third tier, small service provider organizations (including 
francophone community-based organizations within the Greater Moncton LIP for instance) are 
concretely doing the work of service delivery and are the most vulnerable to the delegation of 
ambiguity because it is difficult to move beyond the “services funder/provider relationship.”36 In 
this sense, the federal government has the prerogative not to involve itself in the conflicts between 
local organizations—conflicts it contributes to—and delegate its management directly to them 
while remotely leading collaboration processes.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article analyzed the implication of municipal governments and civil society actors in 
immigration through multilevel and collaborative governance arrangements. By shedding light on 
stakeholders’ agency, on institutional ambiguities and their potential to provide critical openings 
for change in policy making, this research provides new theoretical insights about the factors 
explaining “why” and “how” actors can engage in policy-making processes, despite having no 
formal authority to do so. In this sense, it argues that studying the roles of ambiguities of goals and 
means is critical to our understanding of the activism of political entities with an ill-defined status 
and ill-defined mandates. This analysis is particularly resonant in Canada, extending as it does 
Tuohy’s pioneering study of the roles played by ambiguities in the policy-process (1992). By 
looking at municipal governments and civil society actors, this research allows for a deeper 
understanding of Canadian actors’ and institutions’ capacity to innovate, experiment, and mediate 
between conflicting interests beyond the traditional federal-provincial division of powers and 
without resorting to any major constitutional reforms and debates.  
 
More precisely, this research adds to the literature on the “local turn” and to the work dealing 
with the rescaling of immigration governance in general by highlighting that ambiguities are both 
a condition—i.e., a driver to activism that makes collaborative and multilevel arrangements 
work—and an outcome of collaboration practices. These practices are notably characterized by 
ambiguities regarding the actual balance of power, by collaborative aims in a very competitive 
sector, and by conflicting forms of accountabilities, all of which might weaken these types of 
governance frameworks. Nevertheless, in a context where municipalities and FMCs are in a non-
dominant position within the policy-making process, actors develop adaptive, rather than 
transformative, approaches to ambiguities.  
 
This article also unveils three approaches that actors use in order to deal with ambiguities where 
resources are not equitably distributed and where the role of the federal government is critical. 
These approaches to ambiguities are notably a measure of that organization’s own capacities and 
can be considered a means of reinforcing them. The first approach consists of maintaining forms 
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of ambiguities precisely to make use of this factor enabling activism while at the same time 
allowing for room to manoeuvre in a changing environment. In the second approach, actors seek 
to benefit from the ambiguities of collaborative governance processes to advance their own agenda 
and interests. Finally, the third approach refers to the capacity of stakeholders to delegate the 
management of ambiguities to others, while allowing actors to avoid conflicts and to position 
themselves as leaders in a specific domain.  
 
Beyond the immigration sector, further research could investigate to what extent these strategies 
can be applied to actors involved in different sectors where networks are abundant: homelessness, 
climate change, economic development or Indigenous affairs. In Canada, a better understanding 
of the role of ambiguities in public policy calls particularly for a comparison with Indigenous 
communities, which, as we have seen, are already integrated in immigration networks in 
Vancouver and Winnipeg. Beyond the Canadian case, understanding the role of ambiguities could 
also improve our understanding of networks and their way of functioning. This is notably the case 
of transnational city networks (TCN), which are at the interplay between the subnationalisation 
and the supranationalisation of policies. Indeed, TCNs (comprised of network managers and city 
members) could be further analyzed by looking at the roles played by ambiguities as openings and 
opportunities for getting involved in the governance of immigration, as well as how TCNs deal 
with accountability and legitimacy issues once they are mobilized in policy-making processes 
(Flamant, Fourot, Healy, 2020).  
 
 
1 Such as the Fédération des francophones de la Colombie-Britannique (FFCB), the representative 
organization in British Columbia. The FFCB brings together close to 40 community-based 
organizations spread throughout the province.  
2 The FCFA draws together the representative organizations from each province and territory, as 
well as key national organizations from youth, senior and culture sectors. 
3 The status and recognition of FMC organizations vary by province and territory; in many cases, 
they still face resistance from their provincial or territorial governments when it comes to 
protecting their language rights and offering public services in French. Since the enactment of the 
Official Languages Act in 1969, the federal government funds FMC representative and 
community-based organizations (notably, but not exclusively, through Canadian Heritage). 
Governance within these communities is therefore critically shaped by federal policies. 
4 Except in Saskatchewan where community representatives are elected by universal suffrage 
among the province’s francophone population (Landry and McNichol, 2018).   
5 For instance, the FCFA formally participated in 2019 along with the federal and 
provincial/territorial governments in the discussions held during the Ministerial Conference on the 
Canadian Francophonie. 
6 Governments, service providers, community centres, school boards, universities, Chambers of 
Commerce, employers, health centres, etc. 
7Now IRCC–FMC (Immigration, Refugees, Citizenship Canada-FMC). It is composed of 15 
members from IRCC and FMCs, as well as one provincial/territorial government representative. 
It is co-chaired by IRCC and the FCFA. 
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8 At the time the interviews were conducted, the City of Moncton and the City of Vancouver were 
LIPs agreement holders, whereas Winnipeg was part of the LIP steering committee.  
9 Such as adopting a “francophone lens” in selection methods (e.g. granting an extra 30 points to 
applicants who demonstrate higher level French skills in the Express Entry system).  
10 Interview 13, LIP, Winnipeg, 2018 & Interview 12, public servant, City of Winnipeg, 2018. 
11 Interviews 10 & 9.  
12 Interview 9, RIF member, Moncton, 2017; Interviews 10 & 11, LIP & RIF members, Winnipeg, 
2017. 
13 Interview 14, City of Moncton, 2018.  
14 Interview 11 (translation). 
15 Interview 4, public servant, IRCC (translation).  
16 Interview 4 (translation). 
17 Interview 6, FCFA representative, 2017 (translation).  
18 Interview 9.  
19 Interview 7, FCFA representative, 2017 (translation). 
20 Interview 2, public servant, City of Vancouver, 2018; Interviews 12 & 13.  
21 Interview 12. 
22 Interview 4 (translation).  
23 Interview 6 (translation). 
24 Interview 8.  
25 Interview 12. 
26 Interview 13. 
27 Interview 5, public servant, IRCC, 2017 (translation). 
28 Interview 7 (translation). 
29 Interview 8, public servant, City of Moncton, 2017.  
30 Interview 2.  
31 Interview 6 (translation). 
32 Comprised of representatives from sectors including immigration, employment, legal, academic, 
health and education, the committee advises the City with policies and the development of 
leadership strategies.  
33 The Police board is both connected to and distinct from the municipal council. Even though the 
mayor is the chair of the VPD, the board has its own Police Act.  
34 Interview 4 (translation). 
35 Interview 6 (translation). On this particular point, see Fourot (2018). 
36 Interview 10. 
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